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The process of demographic transition has increased the share of the working-age 
population in Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This situation has created an opportunity 
for economic growth, called the demographic dividend. Global comparisons show that a 
favorable age structure has not always resulted in a boost in economic growth. In order to take a 
full advantage of the MENA’s demographic dividend, it is important to identify different factors 
contributing to economic growth in this region. Investment in women’s human capital is 
expected to have important implications for the region’s economic growth and for maximizing 
the benefits created by the demographic dividend. Using a range of data sources, this paper aims 
to determine the association between women’s human capital (measured by adult educational 
attainment and health status) and economic growth (measured by gross national income per 
capita) in MENA. The findings show a positive association between these two. Specifically, the 
national-level income is generally higher in countries with lower maternal mortality and higher 
female literacy, female tertiary education, female life and healthy life expectancies at birth and 
professional childbirth attendance. Thus, investment in women’s human capital can accelerate 
the pace of development in MENA. 
 




The world has been amazed by the social and political movements taking place in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2010, particularly a large presence of young men 
and women in street demonstrations. MENA includes 19 Muslim countries, 14 countries in 
Middles East (Iran, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Oman, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen and Saudi Arabia) and 5 countries in North Africa 
(Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco). The population of the region was 460,998,000 
(48.8% women and 51.2% men) in 2012 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
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affairs, Population Division 2013). Despite considerable social, economic and political 
diversities among countries in the region (Jones and Karim 2005), the recent movements have in 
part been attributed to high unemployment rates and poverty among young people (United 
Nations Population Fund 2011). 
The process of demographic transition (i.e. changes from high to low rates of mortality 
and fertility) in MENA has increased the share of working-age population and created a 
favorable age structure for economic growth, which is often called the demographic dividend 
(Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2003). In populations consisting of a large proportion of children 
(when fertility is at high levels) or of elderly people (when cohorts born before the fertility 
decline reach old ages), a considerable amount of resources are devoted to the needs of less 
productive segments of the population. This can hinder the pace of economic growth. Between 
these stages and when the population consists of a large proportion of individuals at working 
ages, a window of opportunity for economic growth is opened. This opportunity does not operate 
automatically and depends on the characteristics of individuals and the broad context in which 
they act. As Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003: xi) put it, “the combined effect of this large 
working-age population and health, family, labor, financial, and human capital policies can effect 
various cycles of wealth creation”.  
An extensive literature exists on how changes in the population’s age structure (or the 
distribution of different age groups in the population) can influence its economic growth (see, 
e.g. Bloom and Williamson 1998, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2003, Mason 2003, Mason and 
Lee 2004). In a global comparison, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) show that not all 
countries have benefited from demographic dividend to boost their economic growth. East Asian 
countries have made the most of this opportunity and experienced an unprecedented economic 
development, called an economic miracle. In fact, the demographic dividend has been accounted 
for between one-fourth and two-fifth of East Asia’s economic miracle. Latin America has not 
been as successful as East Asia in making the best use of its demographic dividend; between 
1975 and 1999, the GDP per capital annual growth rate of the region has only been 0.7 percent of 
that in East Asia. They attribute the success of East Asia to implementation of policies 
(particularly trade policies) that facilitate absorbing labor force to productive employments and 
the Latin America’s failure to take a full advantage from its demographic dividend to the lack of 
such policies. 
In order to take a full advantage of MENA’s demographic dividend, it is important to 
identify different factors contributing to economic growth in this region. Human capital is an 
important determinant of long-run economic growth (Hartog and Maassen van den Brink 2007). 
It has been mentioned that women comprise nearly half of the MENA’s population. Thus, 
investment in their human capital is expected to have important implications for the region’s 
long-run economic growth and for maximizing the benefits created by the demographic 
dividend. 
This paper aims to determine the extent to which women’s human capital contributes to 
the economic growth in MENA. Section 2 discusses changes in the region’s age-structure and 
their predictable influences on economic growth. Section 3 reviews the concept of human capital 
and its implications for long-run economic growth. Section 4 presents the main findings of this 
paper: the association between women’s human capital and economic growth. The indicators of 
human capital (adult educational attainment and health status) and economic growth (gross 
national income per capita) are derived from a range of data sources, including the United 
Nations, World Bank, World Health Organization and Population Reference Bureau. These 
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findings will provide more information about the potential economic power of the existing large 
number of young women in MENA, which is important in designing any development 
programmes in the region. Failing to fulfil such capabilities hinders the pace of economic 
growth. But, as importantly, it may lead to further social and political unrests. 
 
 
Demographic Dividend in MENA 
In MENA, the mortality started to fall in the 1950s, but the fertility decline did not 
generally commence until the last two decades of the twentieth century (see Tabutin and 
Schomaker 2005, Roudi-Fahimi and Kent 2007). These changes have predictable influences on 
the age structure of the MENA population. 
As shown in Figure 1, there is a decline in the number of children born since the mid-
1990s. When the baby-boom generation (those born before the mid-1990s) reaches working 
ages, the proportion of either young or old population is still low. This allows large savings at the 
national level, which can speed up the economic growth. This accelerating effect, however, 
disappears when the baby-boom generation becomes old and a considerable amount of resources 
is allocated to their needs. 
 
Figure 1 Age distribution of the population, MENA, 1950-2100 
 
 
Note: For years 2015 onwards, the data are adapted from medium-variant projections.  
Source: data adapted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
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The value of this economic opportunity is enhanced by its uniqueness. Even the 
population momentum and the birth of succeeding baby-boom generations cannot create such an 
opportunity because of the existence of large proportions of old people in the population. As 
shown in Figure 1, the second MENA baby-boom generation is born between 2010 and 2020, 
when the first baby-boom generation reaches reproductive ages (see the rise in the number of 
children under the age of 5 in 2010 and 2015). Although the age-structure effects of demographic 
transition will be observed for several years, the size of succeeding baby booms never exceeds 
that of the cohort born before the mid-1990s. The shrinking working-age population 
accompanied by the aging of previous generations and a growing number of old people in the 
population makes demographic dividend a unique economic opportunity in MENA. 
Figure 2 provides a better understanding about age-structure variations in MENA by 
depicting temporal changes in dependency ratio (DR) in each country and in the whole region. 
DR is calculated by dividing the total number of dependent population (those under the age of 15 
or over the age of 64) to the total number of working-age population (those between ages 15 and 
64). The demographic dividend is nothing but an increase in the labor supply and DRs help to 
capture the period of demographic dividend. The United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2004: 236-240) considers a country to be in demographic 
window when its DR is around 50; this means that the number of dependents is nearly half of the 
number of non-dependents.  
Figure 2 shows that the demographic dividend has already commenced in the MENA 
region (DR in 2010=52.5) and ends in the mid-21
st
 century (DR in 2050=52.6). The maximum 
economic opportunity, corresponding with the lowest DR, is expected to happen in the mid-
1930s (DR in 2035=46.2). Although similar trends are observed in the majority of MENA 
countries, there are some exceptions. In some Arab states of the Persian Gulf (i.e. Qatar, UAE 
and Bahrain) the demographic dividend has started earlier, lasts for a longer period and creates 
more potential for economic growth because their DR reaches very low levels. Qatar is an 
extreme case, entering the demographic dividend in the early 1980s (DR in 1980=54.4), exiting 
it before the mid-2050s (DR in 2045=40.6 and in 2050=63.1) and reaching a minimum DR of 
17.0 in 2015.  
Low levels of DR in these rich oil-producing countries can be resulted from low fertility 
levels or from high levels of immigration. Fewer children reduces the dependent population (the 
numerator of DR), while more immigrants who are typically young and in search of better job 
opportunities increase the nondependent population (the denominator of DR) and both processes 
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Figure 2 Dependency ratio (DR), MENA countries, 1950-2010 
 
 
Note: Dependency ratio is the ratio of population aged under 15 or over 64 to the population 
aged 15-64. For years 2015 onwards, the data are adapted from medium projections. UAE 
stands for United Arab Emirates. 
Source: data adapted from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division (2013). 
 
As seen in Figure 3, these countries display low fertility levels. In 2010, the TFR was 2.5, 
2.2 and 1.7 children per woman in Bahrain, Qatar and UAE, respectively. There are, however, 
other countries in the region which display low fertility levels; e.g. the 2010 fertility level was 
below replacement (TFR<2.1 children per woman) in Iran and Lebanon and at replacement 
(TFR=2.1 children per woman) in Tunisia and Turkey. But DRs in these countries are not as low 
as those in Bahrain, Qatar and UAE. Thus, lower DRs of the latter should be sought in their 
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Figure 3 Total fertility rate (TFR), MENA countries, 1950-2010 
 
 
Note: UAE stands for United Arab Emirates. 
Source: data adapted from World Bank (2014). 
 
As shown in Figure 4, these low-fertility countries display very different net migrations 
(NMs). NM is the net total of migrants, that is, the total number of immigrants minus the total 
number of emigrants. Over the last three decades, Qatar, Bahrain and, in particular, UAE have 
had positive NMs, meaning that the total number of immigrants has been larger than the total 
number of emigrants. This is the period of oil boom and increased oil revenues which resulted in 
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Figure 4 Net migration (NM), selected MENA countries, 1950-2010 
 
 
Note: Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of 
immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. UAE 
stands for United Arab Emirates. 
Source: data adapted from World Bank (2013). NMR for Lebanon in 2000 is missing in the 
main data source and derived from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division (2013). 
 
In Tunisia and Turkey emigrants have outnumbered immigrants, although the difference 
is not substantial. Lebanon and, in particular, Iran display large NM fluctuations. Both countries 
have been exposed to political upheavals not only within their national borders but also in the 
neighboring countries. Iran displays the largest positive NM in the mid-1980s, while the negative 
migration balance reached its highest level in the mid-1990s. Iran was involved in a war with its 
neighboring country, Iraq, between 1980 and 1988. Large migration flows from Iraq and 
especially Afghanistan passed Iranian borders and took refuge from this country during the same 
period. This played an important role in increasing the annual population growth rate of the 
country to 3.9% in 1986 (see Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2002). Repatriations of illegal migrants and 
post-war economic hardships increased the number of emigrants in the 1990s.  
Thus, low levels of DR in Qatar, UAE and Bahrain can be related to their low levels of 
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Human Capital and Economic Growth 
As discussed in the last section, demographic dividend has already started or will soon 
start in many MENA countries. But how can this unique possibility be maximized and 
transferred to economic progress? In the early 1960s, eminent economists such as Theodore 
Schultz and Garry Becker began to emphasize on human, as opposed to physical, capital as an 
important determinant of long-run economic growth (see Schultz 1960 and 1961 and Becker 
1962 and 1964). Many theoretical and empirical researches have been devoted to the subject of 
investment in human capital ever since (see Hartog and Maassen van den Brink 2007, Savvides 
and Stengos 2009, Lutz and KC 2011).  
The concept of human capital was first identified by investment in formal schooling (see 
Shultz 1960 and 1961), but then broadened to include both the quantity and quality of formal 
education, various sorts of training and informal education and the health of the working 
population (see Becker 1964). As Schultz (1962) pointed out, investment in human capital has 
important implications for economic growth; this investment not only changes the structure of 
wages and salaries which is a function of education, health, vocational training, etc. but also 
increases the amount of earnings relative to other sorts of income (e.g. property income).   
Education and health can be considered as the most important forms of investment in 
human capital because they both increase a person’s productivity; education by enhancing skill 
levels and health by providing the opportunity to transfer capabilities to productivity. Higher 
individuals’ productivity can, in turn, be aggregated and transferred to a nation’s prosperity. 
According to Hartog and Maassen van den Brink (2007: 65), “The wealth of a nation is to a large 
extent determined by the educational attainment and health status of their population”.  
Schultz (1961) argues that the economic contribution of education is beyond making 
knowledgeable and capable citizens; it can explain the amount of increase in national income 
that is not explained by the growth of inputs. After accounting for annual forgone earnings of 
formal education, Schultz (1960) suggests that the rate of return to investment in education is 
higher than that on investment in physical capital. International estimates of rates of return to 
education lie between 5 and 15 per cent (Hartog and Maassen van den Brink 2007: 8), with the 
returns being higher in developing countries and for primary education (Psacharopoulos 1985 
cited in Hartog and Maassen van den Brink 2007). 
This study aims to determine how the economic growth in MENA countries relates to 
various measures of women’s education and health status. This allows us to make a cross-
country comparison and understand how investment in women’s human capital relates to 
economic growth. The focus is on women because they comprise nearly half of the region’s 
population and investment in their human capital is expected to have important consequences for 
economic progress.  
It is, however, important to note that comparable investments in human capital do not 
necessarily translate to similar levels of economic productivity. The final outcome is expected to 
depend on broad contextual factors, such as the institution of marriage and labor market 
conditions. For instance, the contribution of women’s human capital on economic growth can be 
conditioned by constrains in women’s participation in paid work after marriage and by unequal 
job opportunities and wages for men and women.  
Muslim countries are generally characterized by stratified gender systems, with men 
being responsible for providing economic resources and women being liable for domestic duties 
(see Groth and Sousa-Poza 2012). This stratification, however, has not resulted in women’s 
exclusion from the labor market. In Iran, married women constitute 48.9% of women who 
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participate in the labor market and 56.2% of employed women in 2011 (Statistical Centre of Iran 
2013).  
Nevertheless, women’s participation in the labor market is generally low in the region. In 
2012, female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) was higher than 40% only in three rich oil-
producing countries of Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait with large migration inflows, 
20-40% in nine countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Turkey 
and Yemen) and less than 20% in six countries (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria) (World Bank 2014). This can, in part, be explained by the long-standing gender-stratified 
roles, making the job market more favorable for men. The fact that more unemployed women 
than men exist in nearly all MENA countries (World Bank 2014) can indicate that the labor 
market is not conducive to offering men and women equal career opportunities, leaving more 
women than men searching for jobs.  
Wage inequality between men and women is another factor which can influence the 
economic outcome of human capital investments. According to the latest Global Gender Gap 
Report (World Economic Forum 2014), men receive higher wages than women for similar work 
throughout the world. The degree of gender wage gap is quite diverse among MENA countries; 
the ratio of female to male wage for similar work varies from 0.81 in Qatar, ranked as the third 
country with the highest value, to 0.56 in Saudi Arabia, ranked as the 108
th
 country of the world. 
Thus, the wage inequality between men and women can be considered another issue in 
transforming human capital to economic growth in MENA. 
Without overlooking the potential contribution of different socio-cultural influences, this 
paper highlights the role of women’s human capital on economic growth. The question is to what 
extent the economic growth relates to women’s human capital in MENA. The next section tries 
to answer this question by examining cross-country variations in women’s education and health 
and the associations between GNI per capita and different indicators of education and health.  
 
 
Women’s Human Capital and Economic Growth in MENA 
Female education is indicated by measures of literacy and educational attainment of adult 
population (see Table 1). These measures do not reflect the quality of education, which has been 
shown to have large and significant effects on economic growth (see Hanushek and Kimko 
2000). However, measures of the quantity of education of adult population (e.g. mean years of 
schooling) have been widely used to identify the impact of human capital accumulation on 
economic growth, due to limitations in cross-country data on the quality of education (see 
Savides and Stengos 2009).  
As shown in Table 1, high female literacy rates are rather common in the region. Except 
for six countries (Morocco, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Tunisia), at least three out of four 
women in each country are literate. Muslim countries, including those located in MENA, have 
experienced considerable improvements in female education (Abbasi-Shavazi and Torabi 2012). 
Different factors have contributed to these improvements, including the influences of western 
and modernization ideologies, the state’s intention to direct socialization through educated 
mothers and egalitarian expectations and aspirations in the society. For instance, In Iran the 
Pahlavi monarchy (1925-1979) introduced major social changes to the society, including 
compulsory schooling for both girls and boys, to stimulate Iran’s resemblance to the West and to 
represent it as a modern country (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonad 2008). Likewise, Kemalist 
reforms starting in Turkey in the 1920s aimed at westernizing and modernizing the country and 
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“the push to increase female education participation was, for the most part, intended to expand 
the state’s influence in socialization via mother-to-child promulgation of the Kemalist ideology” 
(Nauck and Kalus 2008: 288). The egalitarian nature of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) 
and the elimination of cultural sensitivities to girls’ education, such as introducing sex-
segregated schools and appointment of teachers of the same sex, have further increased chances 
of education and led to a marked enhancement in female education in the post-revolutionary Iran 
(see Abbasi-Shavaiz and McDonald 2008 and Torabi et al. 2013).  
Morocco and Yemen display relatively low female literacy rates (43.9 and 44.7%, 
respectively). High female illiteracy rates in Morocco has been attributed to high rates of 
absenteeism and drop-outs which have been caused by traditional gender roles, the poor quality 
of primary education and poverty (Agnaou 2004). The contributing factors in Yemen include the 
lack of infrastructure like roads and education facilities in a highly rural society (71% rural 
population in 2010 according to Population Reference Bureau 2010) as well as the prevalence of 
a patriarchal and stratified gender system (see Augustin 2012).   
There is also a considerable cross-country variation in the attainment of education, 
among countries for which data are available (see Table 1). Rich Arab countries in the border of 
Persian Gulf are generally characterized by higher education as indicated by quite low proportion 
of women who stop education at primary school and relatively high proportions attaining upper-
secondary or tertiary level education. Increasing oil revenues since the 1970s have been 
responsible for massive development in these countries and improvements in education and 
health services (Mujahid 2012). Iran is also characterized by high levels of female education 
(47.3% with secondary school and 14.1% with tertiary education). As mentioned earlier, this can 
be explained by a favorable socio-cultural environment which was created after the Islamic 
Revolution and resulted in social acceptance of female education.  
 

























Middle East      
 Bahrain 90.2 9.3 11.0 34.0 11.9 
 Iran 80.7 35.2 22.5 24.8 14.1 
 Iraq 69.9 na na na Na 
 Jordan 88.9 10.3 29.2 14.3 12.7 
 Kuwait 91.8 6.0 21.5 14.0 11.6 
 Lebanon 86.0 21.5 20.6 18.2 14.2 
 Oman 80.9 9.0 8.0 21.9 11.3 
 Palestine 91.7 36.6 16.4 13.1 18.5 
 Qatar 92.9 6.1 8.3 18.5 35.2 
 Saudi 
Arabia 
81.1 12.3 10.7 12.8 14.8 
 Syria 78.0 24.8 9.6 7.7 4.5 
 Turkey 85.3 44.3 6.1 12.6 8.0 
 UAE 91.5 7.5 11.0 28.7 25.1 
 Yemen 44.7 na na na Na 
North Africa      
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 Algeria 63.9 17.5 14.2 6.6 Na 
 Egypt 57.8 na na na Na 
 Libya 82.0 na na na Na 
 Morocco 43.9 na na na Na 
 Tunisia 71.0 29.8 na 20.5 9.4 
Note: The figures presented in the table refer to the closest date to 2010 for which the data are 
available. UAE refers to United Arab Emirates.  
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute of Statistics 
(2012).  
 
Economic growth widely varies among MENA countries, as indicated by their gross 
national income (GNI) per capita (see Figure 5). In 2010, the maximum GNI per capita (79,426 
US dollars in Qatar) was 33 times larger than the minimum GNI per capita in the region (2,387 
US dollars in Yemen). Overall, oil-producing Arab countries in the border of Persian Gulf 
(Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia) enjoy high income levels; the GNI per 
capita in these countries exceeded 20,000 US dollars in 2010. Yemen is also located in the 
Arabian peninsula and exports oil but its trivial annual economic growth is offset by its large 
population growth (3.0% in 2010 according to Population Reference Bureau 2010) and the 
country suffers from “large-scale challenges like the effects of the global financial and food 
crisis, declining donor assistance, water scarcity under conditions of climate change, and 
security” (Augustin 2012: 152).  
 
Figure 5 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, MENA countries, 2010 
 
Note: UAE stands for United Arab Emirates.  
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2010). 
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The associations between GNI per capita and female adult literacy rate is displayed in 
Figure 6. Higher income is generally associated with higher literacy rate and vice versa. The 
literacy rate in Qatar (92.9%) which is the country with the highest income is twice as large as 
that in Yemen (44.7%) which is the country with the lowest income. The income-literacy 
correlation is relatively strong in the region (0.61), but stronger in high-income Arab countries in 
the border of Persian Gulf, including Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia 
(0.78) than in other MENA countries (0.66). In the latter group, notable literacy variations are 
observed among countries with similar income levels. For instance, Jordan and Egypt have 
similar income levels (GNI per capita of 5,956 and 5,889 US dollars, respectively), but the 
literacy rate in Jordan (88.9%) is 1.5 times larger than Egypt (57.8%).  
 
Figure 6 GNI per capita and female adult literacy rate, MENA countries 
 
Source: Data for GNI per capita adapted from United Nations Development Programme 
(2010). For data source of adult literacy rate, see Table 1. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the associations between GNI per capita and indictors of women’s 
educational attainment. The pattern of this association varies by level of education and between 
rich Arab countries located in the border of Persian Gulf and other MENA countries. As shown 
in Figure 7-Panel A, the association between income and primary school education is negative in 
the former (correlation coefficient: -0.83) but positive in the latter (correlation coefficient: 0.58). 
In other words, higher income is associated with lower primary school education in rich Persian-
Gulf countries but higher primary school education in other parts of the region. In the whole 
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As shown in Figure 7-Panels B and C, there is no evidence to suggest a notable 
association between income and secondary school education (either at lower or upper levels) in 
the rich Arab countries in the border of Persian Gulf but higher income is moderately associated 
with higher upper secondary school education in other MENA countries (correlation coefficient: 
0.46). The income-tertiary education correlation is strong in the region (0.82), but stronger in the 
former (0.83) than the latter group (0.46).  
These findings suggest the positive impact of women's literacy and attainment of high 
levels of formal education on the national-level income in the MENA region. It is worth noting 
that the cross-sectional associations discussed above do not reveal the direction of casualty; i.e. 
more education has produced more income or more income has facilitated investment in female 
education. However, the measures of adult literacy which have been used allow us to assume that 
the accumulation of human capital in the form of education has resulted in economic growth. 
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Figure 7 GNI per capita and indicators of female educational attainment, MENA countries 
A. Adults (25+) with primary school education     B. Adults (25+) with lower secondary school education    
    
C. Adults (25+) with upper secondary school education    D. Adults (25+) with tertiary education  
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As mentioned in Section 3, education enables human beings to recognize their 
capabilities, broaden their opportunities and improve their knowledge and skills; but it is good 
health that enables capabilities to be transferred to productivity. Thus, good health has important 
economic benefits both at the individual and aggregate levels. Reproductive health is an 
important determinant of women’s overall health. It is defined as "a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters 
relating to the reproductive system and its functions and processes" (United Nations Department 
of Public Information 1995). In fact, the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) Programme of Action recognized universal access to education, primary 
health care and comprehensive reproductive health as important elements to achieve sustained 
economic growth and sustainable development (see United Nations Population Fund 2010: 10). 
It is clear that women's reproductive health is achieved when they have access to the legal 
methods of family planning and services that enable them to have a safe pregnancy and 
childbirth.  
Table 2 shows different indicators of female health in MENA countries. In 13 out of 18 
countries, for which data are available, at least half of married women use contraception. The 
highest level of contraceptive use is observed in Iran (74%), followed by Turkey (71%). The 
high prevalence of contraception in Turkey has been achieved in around five decades of 
implementation of an anti-natalist population policy (Solak and Hancioglu 2005) but Iran has 
fluctuated between pro- and anti-natalist policies during the same period, establishing its latest 
anti-natalist policy in 1989. Thus, Iran has accomplished its high contraceptive use in a much 
shorter period by means of a strong family planning program, implemented through a nationwide 
health system and highly approved by religious and political leaders (see Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 
2002). On the contrary, the lowest contraceptive use is observed in Saudi Arabia (24%), 
followed by Yemen and UAE (28%). This has been attributed to limited access to health care 
and its poor quality, especially in rural areas, as well as girls’ early involvement in gender roles, 
as obedient daughters and wives, limiting their decision-making power (see Augustin 2012). 
In most parts of the region, modern contraceptives, which are more likely to be available 
through family planning services, are more common. In Libya, displaying the lowest 
contraceptive use in North Africa (42%), and Bahrain both methods are almost equally used. 
Egypt is an extreme case where 97% of contraceptive devices being used are modern. In other 
North African countries, modern contraceptives are around 6 times more common than other 
types of contraception. In Middle East countries the difference is narrower; modern 
contraceptives are between 1 and 3 times more prevalent than traditional contraceptives.  
Childbirth attendance by skilled personnel is generally high in the region: In 14 out of 18 
countries at least 90 per cent of births are attended by skilled personnel. The four countries with 
lower rates of professional birth attendance include Morocco (63%) and Egypt (79%) in North 
Africa and Yemen (36%) and Iraq (80%) in Middle East.  
 Maternal mortality is quite diverse in the region. Maternal mortality ratio (MMR) ranges 
from 7 (Qatar) to 200 deaths per 100000 live births (Yemen). The three lowest MMRs (7, 12 and 
14 deaths per 100000 live births) belong to the three richest MENA countries (i.e. Qatar, UAE 
and Kuwait). The next five countries with the lowest MMR (20-25 deaths per 100000 live births) 
are Bahrain, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, also located in Middle East. The North 
African MMRs are generally high, ranging from 56 and 58 deaths per 100000 live births (Tunisia 
and Libya, respectively) to 66 deaths per 100000 (Egypt) and 97 and 100 deaths per 100000 live 
births (Algeria and Morocco, respectively). The long-standing low levels of MMRs in Tunisia 
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have been attributed to provision of family planning services and maternal and child health care 
via a network of clinics (Obermeyer 1994).  
Finally, female life expectancy at birth is only 64 years in Yemen but ranges between 72 
(Iraq) and 80 years (Kuwait) in the rest of the countries. The six highest female life expectancies 
belong to rich Arab oil-producing countries either in the border of Persian Gulf (i.e. Kuwait, 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar) or in North Africa (Libya). In addition, notable 
differences between female life expectancy and healthy life expectancy at birth indicate that the 
number of years that women can expect to live in sickness is generally high in the region. This 
difference is between 9-11 years in 13 out of 18 countries for which the data are available. It is 
lower in Turkey and Oman (7 years) and higher in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (13 years in the 
first country and 14 years in the second and third countries).  
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Table 2 Indicators of women's health, MENA countries 
Country Contraceptive 
















at birth (years) 
 2010 2010 2010 2010 2007 2010 
North Africa       
 Algeria 61 52 95 97 63 74 
 Egypt 60 58 79 66 62 75 
 Libya 42 20 100 58 66 77 
 Morocco 63 55 63 100 63 73 
 Tunisia 60 52 95 56 67 76 
Middle East       
 Bahrain 62 31 97 20 66 77 
 Iran 74 56 97 21 62 73 
 Iraq 50 33 80 63 58 72 
 Jordan 59 42 99 63 64 74 
 Kuwait 52 39 100 14 69 80 
 Lebanon 58 34 98 25 64 74 
 Oman na na 100 32 67 74 
 Palestine 50 39 na na na 73 
 Qatar 43 32 100 7 66 77 
 Saudi Arabia 24 na 100 24 64 78 
 Syria 58 43 95 70 65 76 
 Turkey 71 43 91 20 67 74 
 UAE 28 24 100 12 68 79 
 Yemen 28 19 36 200 55 64 
Note: UAE stands for United Arab Emirates. The figures for contraceptive use (all methods and modern methods) for Bahrain and United Arab 
Emirates relate to the year 2008. The figures for births attended by skilled personnel relates to the closest date to 2010. 
Source: Data for contraceptive use (all methods and modern methods),and life expectancy adapted from Population Reference Bureau (2008 and 
2010). Data for maternal mortality ratio adapted from World Health Organisation (2012). Data for births attended by skilled personnel from World 
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Figure 8 shows the association between different indicators of women's health and the 
GNI per capita. Contrary to our expectation, GNI per capita is negatively associated with 
contraceptive use in terms of both all methods (correlation coefficient: -0.39) and modern 
methods (correlation coefficient: -0.38); thus, the higher is the country’s income the lower is the 
use of contraception and vice versa. In Arab oil-producing countries in the border of Persian 
Gulf, there is almost no association between the country’s income and total contraceptive use 
(correlation coefficient: 0.08), but a moderate positive association between income and modern 
contraceptive use (correlation coefficient: 0.39). In other MENA countries the income-
contraception association replicates that of the whole region: a moderate negative correlation.  
The association between GNI and other indicators of women's health is in line with our 
expectation. Higher income is positively and moderately associated with more coverage of 
professional birth attendance both in the rich Persian-Gulf countries (correlation coefficient: 
0.39) and in the rest of the region (correlation coefficient: 0.55). The same pattern is observed in 
the whole region (correlation coefficient: 0.41). The GNI-MMR association is moderately 
negative in the whole region (correlation coefficient: -0.58), strongly negative in the rich 
Persian-Gulf countries (correlation coefficient: -0.90) and moderately negative in the rest of the 
countries (-0.61). Income is positively and moderately associated with both life expectancy and 
healthy life expectancy at birth. The GNI-life expectancy and GNI-healthy life expectancy 
correlation coefficients are, respectively, 0.57 and 0.54 in the whole region, 0.41 and 0.40 in the 
rich Persian-Gulf countries and 0.36 and 0.61 in the rest of the region. Thus, in the latter group 
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Figure 8 GNI and indicators of women's health, MENA countries 
A. Contraceptive use, all methods     B. Contraceptive use, modern methods 
    
C. Births attended by skilled personnel     D. Maternal mortality ratio 
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E. Life expectancy at birth       F. Healthy life expectancy at birth 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This paper began by showing that demographic dividend starts in MENA in the second 
decade of the 21
st
 century and lasts until the middle of the century. Then, it was argued that 
investment in women’s human capital has important implications for long-run economic growth 
and can help to maximize the unique economic opportunity created by demographic dividend. 
The paper applied a range of data sources to create indicators of human capital and determine 
how the economic growth of MENA countries relates to women’s human capital.  
The findings show a considerable cross-country variation in economic growth (measured 
by GNI per capita), women's human capital (measured by measures of adult education and 
health) and the associations between these two. This can be explained by different social, cultural 
and political environment in which human capital is accumulated and translated to economic 
productivity. Being Muslim has not led to homogeneity among MENA countries because of the 
existence of different legal systems influenced form various schools of jurisprudence and 
customary laws from pre-Islamic eras as well as the operation of different political systems in 
which behaviours are formed (see Obermeyer 1992 and 1994). Furthermore, investment in 
human capital depends on other institutional factors such as inheritance of property income and 
differences in opportunities (Becker and Chiswick 1966), which are not identical among MENA 
countries. An examination of the contribution of these contextual factors is beyond the scope of 
this paper but is instrumental in understanding the pathway of the influence of investments in 
women’s human capital on economic progress.  
In particular, the findings suggest positive associations between the national-level income 
and women's literacy as well as attainment of high levels of formal education throughout the 
region. In addition, the GNI per capita was found to be associated with women's better health 
(lower maternal mortality as well as higher professional childbirth attendance, life expectancy at 
birth and healthy life expectancy at birth). However, GNI per capita was not found to be 
associated with higher use of contraception in the region. Thus, the correspondence between 
development and contraceptive use does not apply to MENA. The reason could be sought in 
prevailing gender systems which may undermine women’s autonomy to seek contraception or in 
their limited access to family planning services, but future studies are needed to provide more 
insight about this contradictory finding.  
Although women’s education and health status is now promising in many MENA 
countries, women’s situation needs to progress in some countries such as Yemen in Middle East 
and Morocco in North Africa. Both countries are marked by low income levels and strong 
patriarchal and stratified gender roles (Agnaou 2004, Augustin 2012). There is also a long way to 
increase women’s employment rates to comparable levels to their education and health status. 
The prevailing socio-cultural barriers to female employment, the on-going competition for 
employment between large working-age populations in Muslim countries and over-education are 
responsible for the existing low levels of female participation in the labor market in MENA (see 
Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2002; Jones 2012; Hartog and Maassen van den Brink 2007). Over-
education, defined as “the growth in the supply of better-educated people outpaces the growth in 
demand”  (Hartog and Maassen van den Brink 2007: 101) can be an important contributing 
factor, especially in countries where a large number of women obtain high levels of education 
(i.e. rich countries in the border of Persian Gulf and Iran). In these countries the labour market 
should be ready to absorb the increasing number of better-educated women. In other countries 
(e.g. Yemen, Morocco and Egypt) where women’s education is relatively low, gender gaps in 
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education can reduce women’s competition power in the labour market, especially in urban 
areas. 
This paper showed the positive impact of women’s education and health on economic 
growth, but higher participation of women in the labor market can certainly accelerate MENA’s 
economic growth. Based on the global experience, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) argue that 
the critical policy areas needed to transfer demographic dividend to a sustained period of 
economic growth include public health, family planning, education and efficient economic 
policies that promote labor-market flexibility, openness to trade, and savings. These policies not 
only allow making the best use of a qualified and healthy labor force, but also transfer the 
individual economic earnings to a rapid collective economic growth. This study provided cross-
sectional information about the association between women’s human capital and economic 
growth. Future research can benefit from utilizing longitudinal data to investigate how changes 
in the age structure of the population and in local policies mediated the contribution of 
investment in human capital on economic productivity. 
It is also worth noting that education creates not only economic but also social and 
political advantages for women and for the society. Education can increase women’s confidence 
to engage in social and political activities (Lutz, Cuaresma and Abbasi-Shavazi 2010) and 
change women’s attitude towards childbearing by shifting the importance of the quantity to the 
quality of children (Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald and Hosseini-Chavoshi 2009). Thus, 
improvement in female education in MENA is likely to gradually alter the existing gender 
norms, leading to further changes in women’s economic, social and political standing in the 
future. To conclude, failing to account for the capabilities of women not only hinders the pace of 
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